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Hans Martin Sieg* 
THE EU’S ROLE OR ABSENCE IN  
“FROZEN CONFLICTS” IN TRANSNISTRIA AND CAUCASUS 
 
In a joint communication by the High Representative (HR) and the Commission in May 2011 
the EU announced its readiness to “enhance EU involvement in solving protracted conflicts”.1 
The EU expressed its willingness to become involved in “formats where it is not yet 
represented” such as the Minsk Group and to “outreach to breakaway territories”. Although 
more recent statements from Brussels on the future of the European Neighborhood Policy 
have taken a more careful approach, stressing the primary responsibility of the conflicting 
parties2, there can be little doubt that the ability to contribute to settling these conflicts is a 
test case for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. For how should the EU strive to 
develop a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy worldwide if it cannot 
contribute significantly to overcoming the protracted conflicts in its own neighborhood? 
The extent of the EU’s involvement and the nature of the four conflicts in question – 
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – are, however, quite varied. In 
fact the conflict which today seems to be the most tense and the one where the EU has so far 
been least involved – Nagorno-Karabakh – may be theoretically the easiest to resolve. The 
Madrid principles formulated by the Minsk Group have, in fact, already outlined a solution. 
                                                          
1 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood, May 25, 1001, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0303:EN:NOT 
2 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy, May 5, 2012, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/delivering_new_enp_en.pdf, S. 8. 
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The problem is its implementation. Since leaders on both sides shrink away from the political 
costs, the implementation of a conflict resolution would require a strong supports from more 
united and determined international community. But such unity and determination is lacking 
while tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan are increasing. It is difficult to imagine what 
the EU can contribute under these circumstances; for the EU wields little power and has only 
limited economic leverage in the region. Its potential contribution to a conflict resolution is 
hampered further by the strategic interest the EU attaches to its relationship with Azerbaijan 
for reasons of energy security and the fact that it looks to Baku as a potential ally in the 
conflict over Iran´s nuclear program. Meanwhile Turkey, a crucial ally of the EU, also 
supports Azerbaijan. Since efforts to bring about a rapprochement between Turkey and 
Armenia have so far failed, Yerevan in turn not only needs to maintain the support of Russia 
but also cannot afford to ruin its relations with Iran. Under these circumstances the EU cannot 
be expected to operate as an impartial actor who is able and willing to push if necessary for a 
settlement both in Baku and Yerevan and potentially also in Ankara. The most recent 
indications of this limited commitment is the half-hearted statement by the HR and the 
Commission – which deviated revealingly from the resolution adopted by the European 
Parliament3 – in response to the release of Ramil Safarov, which only expressed concern and 
urged restraint from both sides.4 
The conflicts in Georgia seem to be deadlocked for years, if not decades. After the war of 
2008 the EU played a crucial role in negotiating the cease-fire agreement. But even then it 
was France – in its function as the EU presidency – rather than the EU as such which took the 
lead. If a smaller EU member state had held the presidency at the time, the role of the EU 
would have remained marginal. After the cease-fire agreement the EU enhanced its presence 
through its monitoring mission. Its political and economic leverage however has remained 
limited. For geographical reasons the breakaway territories remain economically tied to 
Russia, while by contrast the EU has comparatively little to offer. The EU stands by its 
Georgian partner, supporting territorial integrity while encouraging Tbilisi to engage with the 
separatist regimes. But not even a strategy of engagement towards the breakaway territories 
promises much progress, at least not in the short or medium term. The Geneva process on 
implementing the armistice agreement has remained the only format in which the government 
of Georgia and the authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia can hold direct talks, but so far 
have done little more than demonstrating the deep distrust and divisions between  the 
respective sides. At the moment the EU has hardly any means of bridging these divisions, let 
alone significantly contributing to a conflict settlement.  
The situation in Transnistria is much less tense or prone to escalation than the conflicts in 
South Caucasus. Though Moldova was ripped apart by bloody civil war in the early 1990s the 
separation of Transnistria did not result in large numbers of refugees such as happened in 
South Caucasus. Given that Moldova has shared a border with the EU since Romania’s 
                                                          
3 European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2012 on Azerbaijan: the Ramil Safarov case, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7-RC-2012-428&language=EN 
4 Statement by the spokespersons of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle 
on the release of Ramil Safarov, 3 September 2012, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132251.pdf 
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accession in 2007, and given that the Chisinau government has made European integration its 
top priority, the EU now has greater political leverage in Moldova than in any other addressee 
of the Eastern Partnership. Brussels also has far greater economic leverage in Moldova and 
Transnistria, with more of the country’s trade going to the EU than to Russia. In addition the 
EU already has a well-established presence in conflict settlement processes, with its EUBAM 
mission at the Moldovan(Transnistrian)-Ukrainian border and its involvement in the 5+2 
negotiations – which it joined as an observer in 2005. For this reason many observers actually 
deem the Transnistria conflict to be the easiest to solve. After the Georgian war of 2008 
German Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy of France therefore suggested that a 
rapprochement between Russia and the West should start with common efforts to solve this 
conflict. 5  This was followed in 2010 by the Meseberg Initiative of Merkel and Russian 
President Medvedev proposing closer cooperation between Russia and the EU in security 
policy, beginning with the Transnistria conflict.6 As a consequence formal 5+2 negotiations 
which had been suspended since 2006 have been resumed in late 2011. This April an 
agreement was reached on the basic principles and procedures of future negotiations, although 
no progress has been achieved so far with respect to substantive political questions.  
Geopolitical and domestic dimensions of the protracted conflicts 
What all these conflicts have in common is the crucial role Russia plays by supporting the 
breakaway territories – though this support is more direct in the case of Transnistria, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia than Nagorno-Karabakh. But at the same time all of these 
conflicts are also shaped by differences in the cultural and political identities of the conflict 
parties. In none of the breakaway territories is there a strong wish among the majority of the 
population for reunification with the mother state. Such antagonism is most pronounced in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving hardly any prospect of peaceful reintegration of the region into 
Azerbaijan. Such sentiments are least developed in Transnistria, although even in that region 
there isn’t much support for reunification with Moldova. At first glance the populations on 
both banks of the Dniester composed of the same ethnic groups, albeit in different 
proportions. But this shouldn’t draw attention away from the fact that large parts of the 
Transnistrian population, particularly the elites, have developed a distinct identity. This is not 
to say that both sides would be unable to live together in one state, but support for 
reunification is limited. Both sides don’t actually care much for each other. On the right bank 
this is illustrated by the fact that according to opinion polls only a very small minority 
considers a conflict settlement to be a priority for Moldova. So even if Russia were to 
withdraw from each of these conflicts, the conflict itself would remain. Owing to the 
economic dependency of the breakaway territories of Transnistria and in Georgia, such a 
withdrawal might result in the economic collapse of the separatist regimes, thus forcing them 
into a settlement. This, however, would actually increase resentment rather than create a real 
willingness for reunification. For these reasons it is necessary to distinguish between the 
                                                          
5 Angela Merkel/Nicolas Sarkozy, Wir Europäer müssen mit einer Stimme sprechen, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
3.2.2009 (http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/391/457053/text/). 
6 Memorandum (Treffen zwischen Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und Präsident Dmitri Medwedew am 4. und 
5. Juni 2010 in Meseberg), http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2010/2010-06-07-
meseberg-memorandum-deutsch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1. 
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geopolitical and the local dimensions of these conflicts. Although both dimensions are 
interconnected, they need to be tackled individually. 
The geopolitical framework for the resolution of each of these conflicts depends primarily on 
relations between Russia and its Western counterparts in NATO and EU. With the Meseberg 
Memorandum Germany responded to Russia’s interest in better integration in the European 
Security Architecture, but linked this to common efforts towards a settlement of the 
Transnistria conflict. Since then, however, the prospects for EU-Russia cooperation have 
deteriorated. They are likely to become more confrontational under a new Putin presidency. 
Rather than mutual interest, differences in values and ideology will probably shape the 
relationship for the next few years, manifested by anti-western rhetoric on the Russian side 
and increasingly vocal criticism in the EU regarding Russia’s democratic deficiencies. As a 
consequence, bilateral relations can be expected to drop down the respective lists of priorities 
because both sides no longer expect much from each other.  
A further consequence is that the policies of the EU and Russia in Eastern Europe will be 
characterized less by cooperation than by competition between different models of 
integration. No longer NATO enlargement but EU integration is now the subject of this 
competition for influence in Eastern Europe. Neither side may have a real interest in this 
competition; but basically it appears to be inevitable. The crucial question is what will be 
extended to Eastern Europe:  the acquis of the EU and effectively its common market, or the 
standards of the customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the Eurasian 
Union. For Russia the implementation of the deep and comprehensive free trade agreements 
which have been or are being negotiated between the EU, the Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
as well as implementation of the acquis of the Energy Community and in particular the third 
energy package would result in a loss of economic interests and political influence. Under 
these circumstances, compromises in the protracted conflicts must appear as unilateral 
concessions for Russia. With the remaining uncertainty over the future course of Eastern 
European countries towards European or Eurasian integration and the remaining political 
instabilities within these countries, it is more likely that Russia will entrench in separatist 
regions for the time being than that it will be prepared to relinquish its positions there. 
This deadlock means there are hardly any prospects for a top-down approach in settling the 
protracted conflicts at the moment. With respect to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group 
lacks the unity necessary to push successfully for a settlement. After the recognition of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia the conflicting positions of Moscow on the one hand and 
Georgia and the EU on the other leave hardly any latitude for substantial negotiations any 
time soon. In the 5+2 negotiations over the Transnistria conflict the next logical step would be 
trying to reach an agreement on basic principles for a settlement. But for the reasons 
mentioned above it seems more likely even in this case that negotiations will soon stall in a 
political deadlock rather than produce any progress on substantive status issues. 
This likely geopolitical deadlock is not the end of the story, but it does mean that for the time 
being a bottom-up approach is required to try to solve practical problems and prepare the 
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ground for a future settlement by bringing the conflicting sides closer together. 7 In other 
words: Since the geopolitical context is not likely to change any time soon, efforts towards 
conflict settlement should seek to first change the local dimension. This is a necessity 
anyway. For even if the geopolitical context did favor a settlement, even in the case of 
Moldova the necessary preconditions for reunification do not exist today. On the one hand the 
political systems are too different to be reconciled within one state. To create a viable state the 
competences of today’s breakaway territories within a reunified country would need to be 
limited to an extent that would be unacceptable to them. A tolerable amount of competences, 
however, would render the creation of a viable state nearly impossible. In the case of 
Moldova, the mother state would first need to consolidate politically, too. Otherwise a 
premature settlement would probably destabilize the whole country. On the other hand any 
settlement other than a final separation has to be built on a common interest, since a common 
identity is lacking. To a large extent this common interest is yet to be created by linking the 
societies and economies more closely together. This requires a proactive strategy of 
engagement towards the breakaway regions by both their mother states and the EU. 
For a long time the policy of non-recognition of the respective mother states and of the EU 
and its member states towards the breakaway territories in Transnistria and the Southern 
Caucasus, resulted in non-engagement and consequently isolation. But this only reinforced 
bunker mentalities and, in consequence, strengthened authoritarian regimes and increased 
their dependence on Russia. Today, the EU supports a strategy of engagement towards 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. In the latter case, the EU is significantly increasing 
its support for confidence building measures. To be sure: The potential impact of engagement 
varies largely from conflict to conflict. Due to the deep divisions and resentment in the 
conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, significant progress can only be expected there in 
the long run. In Transnistria, however, the prospects are brighter.  The Meseberg process may 
not have led to a political breakthrough, but it has contributed to creating a new dynamic in 
the relationship between Tiraspol and Chisinau.  
In December a democratic election took place in Transnistria in which the former hardline 
leadership was voted out of office. Despite starting from an underdog position, the new leader 
received over 70 percent of the vote. His election reflected the population’s deep frustration 
with the economic, political and social problems in Transnistria. He was elected on a platform 
that promoted serious reforms. Under the new administration ideological differences towards 
Chisinau have largely disappeared. Without abandoning the goal of Transnistrian 
independence, the new leadership is seeking pragmatic progress in overcoming the 
impediments for the development of the region which result from the unresolved status 
question. It is striving to improve economic conditions and attract investment – and not just 
financial support – from Russia as well as the EU. Between Chisinau and Tiraspol the level of 
engagement has risen, in particular between the Transnistrian leader and the Moldovan prime 
minister. As a consequence railroad connections have been restored and tax barriers to 
bilateral trade have been abolished.  
                                                          
7 Leonid Litra/Nicu Popescu, Transnistria: A Bottom-up Solution, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy 
Brief, September 2012, http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR63_TRANSNISTRIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf. 
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At the same time however Transnistria remains largely deadlocked due to the geopolitical 
conditions. Moldova is negotiating an association agreement and a deep and comprehensive 
free trade agreement (DCFTA) with the EU.  For Russia, Transnistria and a potential 
settlement of the conflict is also a means of inducing Chisinau to join Moscow’s own 
integration models. Being financially dependent on Moscow and culturally linked to Russia, 
Transnistrian leaders promote the project of Eurasian integration. As a consequence 
Transnistria participates in DCFTA negotiations only at a low level and with just one 
observer, despite being invited by Chisinau to play a more active part. Today, Transnistria 
benefits from the autonomous trade preferences (ATP) granted to Moldova, although these 
will be abolished when the DCFTA enters into force. But what will happen if Transnistria 
refuses to implement the DCFTA itself out of consideration for Russia? In that case 
Transnistria will lose the ATP without being able to benefit from Free Trade. It is difficult to 
assess the potential impact of this, but the result could be an effective trade barrier between 
Chisinau and Tiraspol which could hurt Transnistria badly and deepen the divisions in the 
country. Transnistria may turn out to be the biggest loser of EU-Russian competition over 
integration in Eastern Europe.  
Challenges for the EU 
So far, the EU has not managed to turn its presence and economic leverage in Eastern Europe 
into power.8 Where the EU increased its political involvement in the protracted conflicts this 
was due to the commitment of member states rather than Brussels: France in the case of the 
Georgian War; Germany in the Meseberg process. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
of the EU is yet not an alternative to national policies; in order to be effective the national and 
EU policies have to support each other. In its 2003 security strategy, the EU already stated a 
clear interest with regard to Eastern Europe: wanting a ring of well-governed countries in the 
neighborhood. At the same time the EU acknowledged that the frozen conflicts threatened 
regional stability. But due to a lack of hard power it has not developed a proactive policy. 
Instead its approaches have remained largely responsive. This corresponds to the instruments 
the EU has at its disposal rather than the political goals it formulates. The EU has to rely 
mainly on its soft or transformational power which is based on values rather than interests. 
But the efficiency of the EU´s transformational power depends on the premise that local 
actors are partners who generally share the same fundamental goals. Where this is not the 
case, there is no soft power without hard power; and EU´s influence turns marginal. 
Thus the influence of the EU on settling the protracted conflicts still largely depends on the 
attractiveness of its integration model. This implies that the EU can at most play a supportive, 
but hardly a decisive role in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. With its means the EU can 
mediate and support confidence building, but with the prevailing mistrust and resentment on 
both sides confidence building alone will not change the situation. What this conflict needs is 
a top-down political solution. It is questionable whether EU membership of the Minsk Group 
would make much of a difference. What can the EU do better than France, which is already 
                                                          
8 Nicu Popescu/Andrew Wilson, Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the Eastern Neighborhood, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, May 2011, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR31_ENP_AW.pdf. 
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one of the co-chairs? In Georgia a strategy of engagement and confidence building towards 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia appears to be the only way to create a new dynamic as a way out 
of the deadlocked situation. The EU can support such a strategy, but the path to reconciliation 
and rapprochement will be long. Realistically the aim of such a strategy of engagement thus 
has to be preventing a new escalation and reducing the harmful consequences of de-facto 
separation on both sides.  
In contrast with the Caucasus, in Moldova-Transnistria EU integration will be the crucial 
factor in reaching a settlement. For it will redefine the domestic as well as the geopolitical 
conditions. Geopolitically the most crucial question is the persistent uncertainty over the 
future strategic choice of Moldova between European and Eurasian integration. Though its 
current government is following a clear policy of EU integration, Moldovan politics is still 
characterized by instabilities. Russia holds strong leverage in Moldova, in particular through 
the country’s energy dependency on Moscow and Gazprom’s ability to raise Gas prices. At 
the same time Russia has significant short-term benefits to offer, including cheaper energy 
and possibly even a favorable resolution of the Transnistria conflict. Yet, as long as the issue 
of Moldova’s future integration seems unsettled, Russia would tend to have an interest in 
maintaining the status quo. As soon as Moldova’s European integration appears irreversible, 
the geopolitical situation will be clarified. Progress in this direction is a way to move beyond 
the status quo. 
How can the EU best contribute to conflict settlement under these circumstances? Firstly: By 
supporting EU integration in Eastern Europe the EU should focus more on short-time 
deliverables. The major weakness of the EU´s integration policies in Eastern Europe is that 
they offer long-term benefits to countries but only few short-term deliverables to 
governments. This applies in particular to the two major offers of the Eastern partnership: the 
DCFTA and visa liberalization. At least in the case of Moldova the economic benefits of the 
DCFTA with the EU will probably outweigh the benefits of Eurasian integration.9 But the 
implementation of the DCFTA requires costly and time-consuming reforms.  Visa 
liberalization was offered to deliver a benefit in the shorter term. But it still takes too long for 
governments to be able to present it as a success within current legislative terms.  
Secondly: The EU should further increase its engagement with breakaway territories, in 
particular Transnistria. Outside pressure will only increase the territories’ dependency on 
Russia and Moscow’s need to increase its support for them; for a lack of support could be 
perceived within Russia as abandoning compatriots abroad. Yet, promoting reforms and 
economic developments within the breakaway territories means preparing the ground for a 
rapprochement and a future settlement.  To convince local elites that engagement with their 
mother states and the EU would be beneficial to them, concrete deliverables in term of 
economic opportunities are needed. Thirdly: In particular in the case of Transnistria the EU 
                                                          
9 Valeriu Prohnitchi, Strategic Comparison of Moldova´s Integration Options: Deep and Comprehensive 
Economic Integration with the EU versus the Accession to the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union, 
Economic Analysis and Forecast Paper Nr. 3/2012, Expert-Grup, June 2012, http://pasos.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Moldova-DCFTA_versus_RBK_CU_English.pdf. 
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needs to find a way to make the DCFTA less exclusive and thus less divisive. Postponing the 
DCFTA with Moldova cannot be an option. But at the same time for political reasons 
Transnistria cannot be expected to implement it. Finding a way to prevent severing economic 
links between Transnistria, Moldova and the EU would therefore be crucial for the prospects 
of a future settlement of the conflict.  
 
 
 
